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THE BEGINNING OF PERSONHOOD : 
A THOMISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Philip A. SMITH 
RÉSUMÉ. — Le commencement de la personne : une perspective thomiste explore le 
statut de la vie du fœtus immédiatement après la fécondation. On le fait à l'intérieur 
d'un cadre comprenant à la fois la dimension empirique et la dimension philoso-
phique. L'examen des données biologiques et leur analyse philosophique suggèrent 
que, dans les étapes initiales de son existence, le fœtus ne devrait pas être considéré 
comme une personne, vu que son individualité n'est pas encore arrêtée de manière 
définitive. Toutefois, les changements observables à la suite de l'apparition de 
l'organisateur primaire durant la seconde ou la troisième semaine de gestation sont 
tellement dramatiques qu'un philosophe thomiste peut raisonnablement présumer la 
présence de la forme substantielle humaine (l'âme intellective) qui, tant spéci-
fiquement que numériquement, constitue le fœtus comme personne. 
OVER ten years have elapsed since the Supreme Court's historic and controversial abortion decisions declaring that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy 
was constitutionally guaranteed by her right to privacy.1 Whereas the decisions 
established a national policy on abortion, they neither settled the matter nor quelled 
the controversy. On the contrary, the 1973 rulings intensified the furor over abortion 
and ushered in a new and protracted era of judicial and legislative battles, recycling 
old questions and raising new ones.2 
1. The Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, (1973) and the Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) decisions were 
handed down on the same day : January 22, 1973. Of the two decisions, Roe v. Wade was the more 
important since it established that the woman's constitutional right to privacy was broad enough to 
encompass her decision to terminate her pregnancy. In Doe v. Bolton, the Court further delineated the 
implications of its conclusions in Roe. 
2. In the years following the Wade and Bolton rulings, the Supreme Court confronted the abortion issue 
on at least nine different occasions : Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; 
Bellotti v. Baird I, 428 U.S. 132; Bellotti v. Baird II, 443 U.S. 622; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379; 
H.l. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 ; Beat v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464; Poelker v. Doe, 
432 U.S. 519; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297. The following were among the principal issues decided 
by the Court in these decisions : The state cannot demand consent of either the spouse or the parents 
for a woman to have an abortion. It is legitimate for a state to require parental notification, not 
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At the center of the continuing debate over abortion lies the judgment 
concerning the status of fetal life,3 both in its own claim to sanctity and in its claim 
relative to the competing interests of the mother and society. In its landmark 1973 
decisions, the Supreme Court professed its inability to resolve the complex question 
of when human personhood begins. Insisting that it should not attempt to answer 
questions on a matter which the specialists in that area cannot agree on, the Court 
declared : 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those 
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are 
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development 
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.4 
Although this judicial handwashing established a legal policy on the beginning 
of personhood, it failed to resolve the controversy over nascent life. Indeed, it could 
not. The current biological data on fetal development clearly indicates that a human 
being comes into existence at conception, a human being with a unique and complete 
genetic code. Thus, the destruction of a human being is involved in the very notion of 
abortion. Consequently, before maternal and fetal rights can be balanced, the 
question of the value to be assigned to a human being in its early stages of existence 
must be seriously addressed, since the answer to that question strongly affects the 
conclusions reached about other dimensions of the abortion problem. The greater the 
value recognized in fetal life, the greater the conflict involved in balancing its rights 
with those of the mother, and, consequently, the greater the moral dilemma posed by 
its termination. If the fetus is envisioned as merely part of the mother, like an 
appendix, abortion does not raise any serious moral problems. It should not be 
regulated at all except to insure the mother's safety during the procedure. However, if 
the unborn is regarded as a person from the completion of fertilization, abortion 
raises profound moral issues. It should be legally banned except in a few clearly 
defined instances.5 
Since it is my conviction that the matter of fetal life is at the heart of the abortion 
controversy, this article will develop a position on the beginning of personhood. This 
inquiry will employ a framework that embraces both the empirical and the 
theoretical. The empirical looks to the available biological evidence on fetal 
development, and the theoretical probes the impact of that data for the status of 
nascent life. The methodological device used in this study of the problem of human 
beginnings will be to break the topic down into the following questions : Is the fetus 
alive? Is the fetus a human being? Is the fetus an individual human being? Is the 
consent, in cases involving unmarried, dependent, and immature minors. The state is also permitted to 
fund childbirth under its medicaid programs without being required to pay for abortions. The Court 
also upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which forbade the use of federal funds for 
abortions except in a very few instances. 
3. Although there are different names given to the unborn at the various stages of gestation, I will 
generally refer to the unborn as the "fetus". Other usages will be clear from the context. 
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159. 
5. Richard MCCORMICK, S.J., "Abortion : A Changing Morality and Policy?" Catholic Mind 11 (October 
1979): 44^7 . 
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fetus a person?6 This last question really contains two distinct ones: What is a 
person and when can that term be legitimately applied to the unborn? 
In formulating responses to these proposed questions, the point of departure will 
be the empirical, the biological occurrences during the initial stages of fetal existence. 
In particular, the focus will be on the difference in the behavior patterns of the 
developing organism before and after implantation has occurred. Special attention 
will be given to the appearance of what is termed the "primary organizer." The 
advent of this mysterious organizer seems to be the decisive event both for the 
differentiation of cells into bodily systems and for the definitive determination of 
biological individuality. 
In the next of this study, the focus will shift to the theoretical, to an assessment of 
the biological data and its possible meaning for the question of personhood. Here, 
the perspective will be philosophical. The relevant scientific data must be included in 
any discussion of human beginnings, but it cannot be decisive because the meaning of 
personhood transcends the realm of science. Ultimately, it is a philosophical matter. 
The conclusion that the fetus is or becomes a person at some specific point during 
gestation implies a philosophical judgment since it assumes that the biological stage 
in question reflects the presence of personhood. Before such a conclusion can be 
persuasive, some line of reasoning must be developed to indicate why this particular 
phase is decisive. The task of supplying that line of reasoning is part of the 
philosophical perspective. 
A note of caution must be added here. To say that the matter of human 
beginnings is best discussed philosophically does not mean that any particular 
philosophical position would be universally acceptable. Obviously, different philo-
sophical presuppositions, different methodologies, and different reasons for posing 
the question in the first place will yield different conclusions. However, the 
philosophical approach reflects a disciplined effort to ask the proper questions, to 
ask them in the proper order, and, above all, to try to protect against the definition of 
what it means to be human from being reshaped merely to justify a stance in favor of 
abortion.7 
The philosophical framework employed in this article for the discussion of 
human personhood and its beginnings will be that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Not only 
is his system as philosophically consistent as any other, but its metaphysical structure 
makes it ideally suited for taking full account of the biological data. The fact that 
Aquinas' metaphysics is grounded in the order that reason discovers in nature rather 
6. "A New Catholic Strategy on Abortion," Editors of Month 234 (1973) : 163-171. The format for this 
article was suggested by this editorial, although the questions are phrased in a slightly different 
manner and answered in a completely different fashion. Another article I found helpful was 
"Personhood and the Beginning of Human Life," by Gabriel PASTRANA, O.P., The Thomist 41, N° 2 
(April 1977): 247-294. Although this article is long and, at times, quite philosophical, it is a fine 
presentation of the topic. Another useful article was "Ethical Horizons of Human Biological 
Development," by John MAHONEY, S.J., Month 239 (1978): 329-333. 
7. Idem, "A New Catholic Strategy on Abortion," pp. 164-165. 
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than imposes upon it, not only allows, but demands that the scientific information on 
fetal development be incorporated into the discussion on the beginning of 
personhood.8 From an examination of that data and its philosophical analysis, this 
study suggests that the fetus should be considered a person from the time that 
biological individuality is irreversibly established. With this introduction as a 
background, the questions proposed above may now be investigated. 
IS THE FETUS ALIVE? 
This question does not arouse much controversy since living things can generally 
be easily distinguished from non-living things. Living entities grow and develop, 
ingest and digest, reproduce and respond to stimuli, etc. Sometimes dubious cases 
such as viruses are included among the living : sometimes they are not. However, a 
zygote9 cannot be classified as a dubious or borderline case. At fertilization, 
23 chromosomes from the sperm join with 23 chromosomes from the ovum to form 
a unique new organism, independent and genetically complete. This new organism 
quickly indicates that it is alive by beginning cell division almost immediately after 
the process of fertilization is completed. No one even remotely familiar with the 
information on zygote growth denies that it is alive from the moment of conception. 
It might be argued that both the sperm and the ovum are also alive. However, neither 
of these entities is an independent biological organism, nor does either of them 
possess the genetic information necessary for self-development. The sperm is 
genetically identified with the father, and the ovum genetically equated with the 
mother. Each possesses only 23 chromosomes, and neither can reproduce itself. The 
destiny of the sperm is to fertilize an ovum or to die, while the purpose ot the ovum is 
to be fertilized or also to die. But the zygote has a life of its own, independent of 
either parent, except for oxygen, nutrition, and shelter. 10 
IS THE FETUS A HUMAN BEING? 
With the question of how human life differs from life in general, a terminological 
problem should be mentioned. Several terms keep recurring in the discussions over 
fetal life which many authors use interchangeably, while others do not. Among such 
terms are man, humanity, human life, human being, human individual, and human 
8. St. THOMAS AQUINAS, O.P., Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Trans, by C.I. Litzinger, O.P., 
Vol. 1. (Chicago : Henry Regnery Co., 1964) : Book 1, Lecture 1, p. 6. The relevant part of the text is as 
follows : "There is one order that reason does not establish but only beholds, such is the order of 
things in nature. There is a second order that reason established in its own act of consideration, for 
example, when it arranges its concepts among themselves, and the signs of concepts as well, because 
words express the meanings of the concepts... The function of natural philosophy is to consider the 
order of things that human reason considers but does not establish — understand that with natural 
philosophy here we also include metaphysics. The order that reason makes in its ov/n act of 
consideration pertains to rational philosophy (logic), which properly considers the parts of verbal 
expression with one another and the order of principles to one another and to their conclusions/' 
9. Zygote is the name given to the new organism formed from the union of the sperm and the ovum. For 
a discussion of the relationship of the zygote to personhood, see Lisa NHWTON, ''Humans and 
Persons: A Reply to Tristram Englehardt," Ethics 85 (July 1975): 332-335. 
10. Andre E. HHLLLIGERS, "Fetal Development,'" Theological Studies 31 (1970): 4-5. 
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person. Authors who believe the fetus is a person from conception are apt to 
interchange all these concepts. However, writers who place the advent of person later 
than conception or implantation are likely to distinguish between a human person 
and all the other terms.11 
As the term is used in this article, human being refers to the characteristics of a 
living entity which has human origins. Thus, the question of what constitutes a 
human being poses few problems. Every species 12 of a living thing can be defined 
biologically according to its genetic pattern. Genetics clearly indicate that only a 
human child can be born from the union of a human sperm and a human ovum. 
From the moment fertilization is completed, the zygote is a being with a unique and 
complete genetic package which is specifically human and which places it within the 
human species. Biologically, it is a human being. 
However, saying that the zygote is an alive human being with a unique genetic 
code is not the same thing as saying that the zygote is an individual human being. The 
late Andre Hellegers has pointed out that "although at fertilization a new genetic 
package is brought into being within the confines of one cell, this anatomical fact 
does not necessarily mean that all of the genetic material in it became crucially 
activated at that point, or that final irreversible individuality has been achieved." 13 
To answer the question of the definitive individuality of the human being, the 
activities of the zygote in its initial stages of development must be examined. 
Especially significant for the problem of fetal individuality is the difference in the 
organism's behavior patterns before implantation as opposed to after that event his 
occurred. 
IS THE FETUS AN INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING? 
Biological Considerations 
In the process of development which begins with fertilization, there are stages of 
growth and organization to which various names have been given. The first step in 
the growth of the fertilized ovum is cell division or mitosis. Here, the zygote divides 
into two carbon copies of itself called blastomeres. These in turn divide into four, 
then eight, and so on. Within a few days, this process of division produces a solid 
cluster of blastomeres known as the morula.14 Division continues and results in the 
formation of a hollow sphere of cells called the blastocyst, with the embryo itself 
being referred to as a blastula. At this stage, the cells of the developing organism are 
already differentiated into two general types : the inner and out cell masses. The cells 
facing inward are destined to assume the form of the fetus and will eventually take on 
the features of a child. Following a different dynamic, the remaining outer cells, now 
known as the trophoblast, begin the task of implantation and are destined to become 
11. Sissela BOK, "Who Shall Count as a Human Being?", In Abortion: Pro and Con, ed. Robert Perkins 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1974), p. 94. 
12. HELLEGERS, pp. 4-5. 
13. Ibid, p. 5. 
14. B.I. BALINSKY, An Introduction to Embryology, 4th ed. (Philadelphia : W.B. Saunders Company, 1975), 
pp. 114-119. 
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the placenta and the fetal membranes. The function of the trophoblast is to establish 
contact with the maternal uterus and to mediate between it and the fetus by supplying 
the latter with nourishment.15 However, despite the flurry of highly organized and 
complex activity that is taking place during these early stages of the human being's 
existence, there is reason to believe that the organism's unique individuality is not yet 
definitively established. 16 
The reluctance of biologists to affirm irreversible individuality at this level oi' 
development rests on the conviction that the zygote and the cells formed from the 
zygote remain somewhat indeterminate for two or even three weeks after fertilization 
is completed. During that time, the zygote sometimes divides to produce identical 
twins or even multiple identical offspring twinning. Furthermore, experiments seem 
to indicate that these multiple offspring can be recombmed into a single organism 
capable of subsequent normal growth recombination. The phenomena of twinning 
and recombination strongly suggest that in the early stages of development, fetal 
individuality is not irreversibly fixed. 17 A clue for some understanding of the zygote's 
apparent indeterminancy can be found in the notion of cell differentiation. 
As the zygote undergoes its numerous cell divisions, every cell is totipotential, 
i.e. it is undifferentiated and as such has the capability of developing into any type of 
subsequent cell (bone, blood, brain, etc.). Laboratory experiments offer support for 
this conclusion.18 A developing cluster of cells can be divided into two parts, and, if 
the parts are allowed to grow separately, each one will develop into a normal adult. 
This amounts to artifically induced twinning. If these two separated groups of cells 
are rejoined before the cells are differentiated, a normal single entity will result an 
example of artificial recombination.19 A further note may be added. If, prior to 
differentiation, cells from one part of the morula are grafted unto another part of the 
morula, the developing organism is not affected. However, if the grafting is done 
after differentiation has taken place, some type of monster will result.20 Consequently, 
an examination of cell differentiation can offer some insight into the meaning of fetal 
behavior during its early stages of gestation. 
The decisive event for cell differentiation seems to be the appearance of what is 
called the primary organizer.21 It originates on the posterior, lower lip of the blastula 
toward the end of the second week of gestation during the blastocyst stage. Biologists 
are much more familiar with what the primary organizer does than with what it is or 
15. Ibid., pp. 265-273. 
16. Gabriel PASTRANA, O.P., "Personhood and the Beginning of Human Life," The Thomist 41, 
N° 2 (April 1977) : 276. In this section, Pastrana offers a detailed discussion ot the fetus1 biological 
individuality. 
17. HELLEGERS, pp. 4-5. 
18. Not everyone agrees with this conclusion. Some insist that there is insufficient experimental data on 
humans to justify such a stance. However, Balinsky, Hellegers, and Diamond offer evidence that is 
convincing to me. 
19. James J. DIAMOND, M.D., "Abortion, Animation, and Biological Hominization," Theological Studies 
36 (1975): 311-312. 
20. Ibid. 
21. The term, "primary organizer," was first used by H. Spemann in 1927. 
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how it produces its effects. However, regardless of how it performs its functions, this 
organizer seems to play a vital role in effecting cell differentiation and establishing 
biological individuality. n As noted above, a kind of primordial but non-fixed cell 
differentiation has already taken place prior to the advent of this organizer. But the 
emergence of the primary organizer is crucial for the continuation of fetal 
development. James Diamond, M.D. summarizes the effects this organizer produces 
and stresses its necessity for continued fetal development. 
If this organizer does not appear, no subsequent differentiation will occur. If it is 
removed, no differentiation will occur. If it is grafted to another blastula from 
which that blastula's organizer has been removed, the blastula will recommence 
differentiation. No differentiation of specific organ systems can occur unless this 
organizer orders the pluripotential cells to so differentiate into specific organ 
systems that a homo will form. For this reason, the scientist has an almost 
insuperable inclination to identify hominization as being positable no earlier 
than the blastocyst stage \ ... Another crucial point can be made here : when the 
organizer appears in the cell mass, it is irrevocably determined that the unity of 
the individual is established ; for twinning can no longer occur and reconjunction 
can no longer occur. In short, the biologist holds that the numerous biological 
events converging in the general time area of the 14th to 22nd day weigh extremely 
heavily in any calculus of the beginning of the life of the homo.23 
These biological considerations provide the basic information necessary to 
answer the question under examination: is the fetus an individual human being? 
Twinning and recombination, the capability of cells to cross-graft, and the dramatic 
results produced by the primary organizer, force the conclusion that the status of 
fetal individuality differs remarkably once the primary organizer has emerged. 
Diamond's conclusion is quite plausible. The various biological events which can 
occur as late as the twenty-second day of gestation strongly suggest that fetal 
individuality is not irreversibly settled until after that span of time. With this brief 
summary of the relevant biological information concerning fetal individuality, it is 
now time to turn to a philosophical analysis of that data to assess its philosophical 
meaning for the question of whether the fetus is an individual human being. 
Philosophical Analysis 
Because they work with empirical data, there is fairly general agreement among 
biologists on the matter of fetal development. However, philosophers do not achieve 
the same consensus in determining the significance of the fetus as a biological entity 
for a philosophical concept of individuality and of person. Philosophers frame the 
issues in light of their presuppositions and predispositions. These sometimes conflict 
so that the same biological information is interpreted in a number of different ways. 
Yet, despite the difficulties, some attempt at philosophical analysis is necessary if the 
scientific information on zygote growth is not to be ignored in the search for the 
22. BALINSKY, pp. 202-207. In these pages, Balinsky provides a fine overview of the nature and function of 
this mysterious organizer. 
23. DIAMOND, p. 315. 
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meaning of human personhood and its beginnings. As mentioned above, Aquinas' 
philosophy is admirably suited for this task. Because its metaphysics is grounded in 
the natural order, a Thomistic philosophical analysis of the individual biological 
entity will entail a process of discovery rather than imposition. Thus, instead of being 
forced into some preconceived straight jacket, the emerging organism can be allowed 
to reveal its own internal structure. Since Aquinas' terminology may be unfamiliar to 
some readers, a few general comments about the central terms will be helpful. 
Particularly important are his understanding of substance and accidents, potency and 
act, essence and existence, matter and form, and the principle of individuation. 
Thomistic Terminology 
An important element in Aquinas' metaphysics is the division of being into the 
categories of substance and accidents. A substance refers to a complete and 
individual entity which is able to exist by itself in that it possesses its own act of 
existing,24 and in itself, in that it is not just a modification of some other thing. This 
independent manner of existence is called subsistence.25 However, an accident 
cannot exist by itself, but only as a modification of a substance which shares its 
existence with it.26 For example, color can only exist in some colored object. In non-
technical language, the distinction between substance and accidents is the difference 
between things and their modifications, as is evident from a brief analysis of two 
basic types of change : accidental and substantial. When accidental change occurs, 
the specific character of the thing remains the same. A tree may increase in size, its 
leaves may grow or die, but it is still spoken of as the same tree. But, if the tree is 
burned into ashes, it is no longer referred to as a tree. A more radical kind of change, 
a substantial change, has taken place, resulting in a completely different thing. In 
substantial change, elements of continuity and discontinuity are involved. Continuity 
is present because the matter has not been annihilated. However, there is also 
discontinuity since a different kind of substance exists after the burning.27 To explain 
what happens during the phenomena of both accidental and substantial changes, 
Aquinas turns to an analysis of the internal principles of being, beginning with the 
celebrated theory of potency and act. 
Change is a passage from one state of being to another. It is this transition which 
forms the basis of the distinction of all being into the correlative principles of potency 
and act. Potency is an entity's capability to perform an action or to acquire a 
24. This term will be explained below. 
25. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Question 3, Article 5, Response to the first objection. When 
Aquinas is cited directly in this work, I will give the reference to the specific work, edition, and 
publisher. However, future references to the Summa will be in abbreviated form. For example, the 
present reference would read: Summa Theologica, I, q. 3, a.l., ad 1. 
26. Ibid., I, q. 77, a.l., ad 2. 
27. Charles A. HART, Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), 136. A good, general discussion of the basic ideas contained in Aquinas' 
metaphysics can be found in: Aquinas, by F. C. COPLESTON, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), 
Chapter two, "The World and Metaphysics." 
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perfection. Act represents something definite, the fulfillment of potency.28 A block of 
marble is potentially a statue, but that potential is fulfilled only when a sculptor 
shapes the marble into an actual statue. An additionnai point must be noted. While 
potency in itself is unrealized, its realization must be possible. Outwardly, an acorn 
and a small stone may bear a close resemblance to one another, but the oak tree is 
potentially in the acorn whereas it is not in the stone. This relationship is all-
pervasive in Aquinas' thought and surfaces in two other important distinctions found 
in finite beings : essence-existence and matter-form. 
Perhaps the most important of all the compositions found in finite beings is that 
of essence and existence (esse), the distinction between what something is and the act 
by which it is. Some insight into this difficult doctrine can be gotten from the ordinary 
use of language.29 If a child asks about the meaning of the words, elephant and 
dinosaur, an explanation of each can be given without adding that elephants exist 
while dinosaurs do not. Meaning can be separated from existence. Aquinas envisioned 
essence as the definition of a thing,30 the determining factor making the entity to be 
the particular kind of reality it is. In itself, essence is only a possible being. For 
example, humanity has no concrete existence. It becomes objectively real only when 
it exists in individual people. Existence is the act by which an essence is actualized in 
some material thing. Since nothing is objectively real unless it exists, Aquinas 
regarded existence as the primary reality, and the act of existing as "the act of all acts, 
the perfection of all perfections."31 
Although distinct, essence and existence are nonetheless very closely related. The 
act of existing changes essence from a possible existent to a component of a material 
entity, while a being's essence limits the act of existing to actualizing this specific kind 
of thing rather than another.32 However, the fact that something exists does not 
mean that its essence has been completely actualized. In Aquinas' thought, existence 
is used primarily as a verb (esse). As such, existing beings are dynamic and open to 
continuing development. Each existing thing must strive for the maximum actualiza-
tion of the possibilities contained in its essence, if it is to reach its full potential. In the 
process of life, an acorn grows to become an oak tree, the child to become an adult. 
A second instance of the potency-act relationship in material beings is prime 
matter and substantial form. Of the two, substantial form is the more important. It 
represents an essence as actualized in the individual, and it guarantees that a being 
will be this particular kind of entity and nothing else. An acorn will always grow into 
an oak tree, not a prune tree. Since it is the organizing principle of a living organism, 
the substantial form is the source of a being's internal unity and the root of its specific 
activity and growth. Thus, while we cannot directly experience this form, we can infer 
its reality by observing a being's activity. Actions flow from being. Plum trees 
28. Summa Theologica, I-II, q.3, a.2. 
29. F. C. COPLESTON, Aquinas (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), 99-102. 
30. AQUINAS, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Trans, by John P. Rowan, Vol. 1. (Chicago : 
Henry Regnery Co., 1961), Book V, Lesson 10, p. 349. 
31. Idem, Summa Theologica, I, q.4, a.l, ad 3. 
32. COPLESTON, pp. 100-102. 
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produce plums, not peaches. By examining a thing's operations, we can learn 
something about the source of its operations or its substantial form. For Aquinas, a 
substantial form does not exist by itself. Rather it is an internal principle, together 
with matter, of each individual existing within the same category of beings. For 
example, each person is a human being and possesses a human essence. However, 
humanity as such is an abstraction which actually exists only when it is concretized in 
some individual person.33 
Substantial form is one component of an individual entity ; prime matter is the 
other. It is the changing and passive reality that is determined by substantial form. 
This matter cannot exist apart from form, nor can it be directly experienced. Unlike 
secondary matter which is visible and has definite characteristics, primary matter is 
pure potency and is capable of existing in union with an indefinite number of forms. 
When substantial change occurs as in the burning of wood, experience indicates that 
some reality abides during the transformation of wood into ashes. From Aquinas' 
perspective, prime matter is the principle that provides the element of continuity.34 
Finally, a difficulty connected with the doctrine of matter and form needs to be 
touched upon : the principle of individuation. The problem is this : if all individuals 
are composed of matter and form, then how can there be numerous distinct 
individuals within the same species? Why are there billions of persons instead of just 
one? How can individuals possessing the same essential human nature be numerically 
distinct from one another? The solution is found in the principle of individuation. 
Aquinas ruled out form as the individuating principle because form or essence is 
universal and can exist in many individuals. Nor can accidents account for 
individuality since the individual belongs to the category of substance. Therefore, 
prime matter is the only other possibility. However, as noted above, prime matter is 
pure potency in itself and can be specified by endless forms, so something else is 
needed. Aquinas proposed that it is prime matter with extension, or prime matter as 
intrinsically related to quantity, that is the source of individuation. This intrinsic 
ordination of prime matter to quantity acts as a separating boundary distinguishing 
this individual from all others and giving it a unique identity. For example, it allows 
identical twins to be identical in everything except for the numerical separation.35 
Philosophical Individuality 
Aquinas referred to an individual as a subsisting being composed of matter and 
form, undivided in itself and divided from every other thing.36 "Undivided in itself 
pertains to the entity's indissoluble unity, while "divided from every other thing" 
situates the individual within the realm of existing things in its own unique way. 
Because of its subsistence, the individual relates to its own being in a way that implies 
33. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I, q. 118, a.2, ad 2. 
34. Ibid., I, q.66, a.l. 
35. Ibid., I, q.47, a.2. A useful source for Thomistic metaphysical concepts is : The Elements of Philosophy, 
by William A. WALLACE, O.P., (New York: Alba House, 1977), especially Chapter 5. 
36. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I, q.29, a.4. 
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both possession and exclusion. Subsistence means possession of being in a fashion so 
absolute that the individual becomes inviolable, in a fashion so exclusive that 
participation in its being or self-communication of its being would amount to 
destruction of the individual's nature.37 
A final point should be added. Since matter is related to form as potency to act, 
there has to be some proportion between a being's matter and form, i.e. matter has to 
be suitably prepared before it can be specified by a particular form. For example, 
Aquinas held that the rational or human soul is the substantial form of the human 
person, but he also insisted that the soul is not infused into the fetus at the first 
moment of its existence. In the early stages of gestation, the fetal matter is not well 
enough organized to receive it. Instead, the fetus is immediately animated by a 
vegetative soul, followed in turn by an animal or sensitive soul. Finally, when the 
fetal matter is suitably prepared, the rational soul is infused.38 Applied to the 
question at hand, this understanding of individuality would caution a Thomistic 
metaphysician against attributing the status of "individual human being" to the fetus 
before it fulfilled two closely related conditions : First, it must be biologically settled 
whether one or more entities have emerged from the fertilization. Secondly, fetal 
matter must be adequately developed and organized to receive the form which will 
qualify it as an individual human being.39 
If the biological and philosophical understanding of individuality are compared, 
important areas of agreement surface. The biological information reveals that the 
zygote undergoes profound developmental changes during the initial stages of its 
existence. The time from fertilization to implantation can be characterized as one of 
rapid growth combined with a high degree of organization. Yet, the emerging 
organism still remains unstable, its internal unity incomplete. Twinning and 
recombination are still possible ; the cells remain largely undifferentiated. The crucial 
event for this phase of gestation is the coming of the primary organizer. As noted 
earlier, its advent signals the end of twinning and recombination, the beginning of 
cell differentiation into specific organ systems, and the presence of the entity's 
internal unity. Biologically, the fetus is now an individual human being. 
Since Aquinas' metaphysics is grounded in the order which reason discovers in 
nature, philosophical individuality cannot be ascribed to the fetus until its biological 
individuality has been irrevocably established in the natural order. In light of the 
biological data, the fetus does not seem to meet the philosophical requirements for 
individuality prior to the presence of the primary organizer. The lack of internal 
stability and numerical unity until this time mark this phase of gestation as a process 
of gradually preparing the fetal matter for the reception of human form. Consequently, 
the dramatic events accompanying the appearance of the primary organizer are as 
critical for the philosopher as they are for the biologist. The Thomist interprets the 
changes in the behavior patterns as a sign that the matter has been sufficiently 
37. Ibid., Ill, q.73, a.2. 
38. Ibid., I, q.76, a.4. 
39. DIAMOND, p. 315. 
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organized to receive the substantial form which establishes the fetus both specifically 
and numerically as an individual human being. When does the fetus become an 
individual human being? Both the biological evidence and its philosophical 
interpretation lean toward the second or third week after fertilization.40 
Since the terms, primary organizer and implantation, have been used somewhat 
interchangeably in this study, a word of explanation will be helpful. The primary 
organizer is a norm intrinsic to the fetus and part of its internal structure. 
Implantation is an event external to the fetus and reveals a social relationship of the 
fetus to the mother. The primary organizer is the key to both biological and 
philosophical individuality, but its appearance is not visible during the normal 
process of gestation. Therefore, since implantation cannot occur without the 
organizer and since implantation follows almost immediately upon the organizer's 
appearance, implantation can be used as a practical guide for determining the 
presence of an individual human being. However, implantation is not in itself the 
significant factor. 
Although a close parellel can be drawn between the biological and philosophical 
concepts of individuality, it should not be forgotten that two distinct disciplines are 
involved. The biologist can appeal to empirical evidence to support his contention 
that the fetus possesses the biological characteristics which locate it within the human 
species and which establish its individuality. The philosopher must theorize from the 
biological information about fetal organization and structure to the conclusion that 
the substantial form is present.41 Because philosophers interpret the biological data 
in light of their particular presuppositions, the same data can yield a variety different 
results. However, if a gap is apparent between biology and philosophy in the matter 
of fetal individuality, it becomes even more pronounced when the question of fetal 
personhood is posed. 
IS THE FETUS A PERSON? 
As mentioned previously, this question contains two distinct ones : what is a 
person, and can that term be applied to the fetus ? Distinguishing between living and 
non-living things, between humans and non-humans, between determinate and 
indeterminate human beings has been relatively easy. However, distinguishing 
persons and non-persons is much more complex and controversial. It is more 
complex because of the equivocal nature of personhood; it is more controversial 
because the approach to personhood affects people deeply since it has far-reaching 
implications for the meaning of life and death and for the value of specific ethical 
actions. Historically, people have always regarded themselves as having a special 
position among the beings of nature. However, there has always been, and there still 
is, vast disagreement as to why people are special. As Lisa Newton of Fairfield has 
pointed out, personhood has rarely been confined to the human beings of a society. 
40. Ibid., p. 315. Cf. also PASTRANA, pp. 281-282. 
41. PASTRANA, 278-284. In these pages, Pastrana presents a careful analysis of the relationship between 
the biological and the philosophical. 
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Most societies have applied the term to their Gods : the United States confers legal 
personhood on various sorts of corporations. Nor has every society granted full 
personhood to all its human beings. In some civilizations, personhood has been 
conferred upon human beings or withheld from them for a number of different 
reasons, including gender, family lineage, social category, racial class, and ethnic 
origin. For example, the authors of the United States Constitution did not intend to 
include blacks as full human persons in the protections specified for citizens.42 
What is a person ? Is it an endowment or an achievement ? Are all human beings 
persons? If not, what qualities must a human being possess before it can be classified 
as a person? Moreover, what kind of concept is personhood? Is it functionnal, 
relational, psychological, philosophical, religious, or moral ? An underlying assump-
tion of this study is that personhood is fundamentally a metaphysical reality, an 
endowment rather than an achievement. While the other concepts of person are 
important and enriching, they are nevertheless developments and extensions of a 
metaphysical personhood which preserves persons' self-identity as they undergo 
dramatic changes throughout their life. 
Aquinas' Concept of Person 
In line with the thinking of his time, Aquinas defined person as "what is most 
perfect in all of nature — that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature."43 In 
his perspective, a subsistent individual "implies a complete substance, subsisting in 
itself and separate from all else."44 With every other substance, a person shares in the 
common properties of an individual : unity, self-sufficiency, and incommunicability. 
However, person is a very special kind of being, one who deserves to be placed at the 
summit of material creation. 
Aquinas' understanding of "rational creature" explains his exalted status 
person. As a substance, a person is a combination of matter and form, but more 
commonly referred to as a unity of body and soul. Broadly speaking, the soul is the 
"first principle of life in those things which live."45 In this sense, every living thing 
obviously has a soul. However, persons are set apart from the rest of the animate 
world because their souls are rational or intellectual.46 In elaborating his theory 
about the nature of the human soul, Aquinas followed his philosophical conviction 
that each thing acts according to its nature. Consequently, Aquinas reasons from 
human functions to faculties, and from faculties to the soul in which these faculties 
inhere.47 
42. Lisa NEWTON, "Humans and Persons: A Reply to Tristram Engelhardt," Ethics 85 (July 1975): 335. 
43. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I, q.29, a.4. 
44. Ibid., Ill, q.16, a. 12; ad 2. 
45. Ibid., I, q.75, a.l. 
46. Ibid, I, q.29, a.l. 
47. This follows from the well-known philosophical axiom : "operation follows from being" (Operatio 
sequitur esse). 
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Aquinas singled out the act of understanding, the act of the intellect seeing or 
accepting something as true, as the most specifically human of all the human 
activities. However, understanding would be impossible unless the intellect is an 
immaterial faculty.48 In knowing themselves and other beings, persons indicate their 
capability of transcending the limitations of matter and the conditions of time and 
space. Intelligent beings are self-conscious, they can know themselves from within. In 
this process of self-discovery, they first experience their own immateriality, even if it 
is only in a pre-conscious and pre-conceptual manner. They know other beings 
completely only by thought which is immaterial and is experienced as such. Thus, a 
person's ability to understand is a sign that the intellect is an immaterial faculty.49 
Since function flows from being, and since the soul has a faculty which 
transcends matter in its operation, the soul itself must also be immaterial. Moreover, 
the soul's ability to function independently of matter also reveals it to be a self-
subsisting reality, i.e. it has its own act of subsisting. As Aquinas phrased it : 
(T) he intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an 
operation per se apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an 
operation per se. For nothing can operate but what is actual ; wherefore a thing 
operates according as it is :... We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, 
which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and 
subsistent.50 
However, Aquinas balances out his emphasis on the spirituality and the 
independence of the soul with his experiental awareness that a person exists and acts 
as a single unit. The person who thinks is the same one who exercises all the other 
human functions. St. Thomas could envision all these diverse activities being united 
in the one person only if the human soul was the single organizing principle in the 
body or was its substantial form. In its function as form, the soul is related to the 
body as act to potency. Since it is a self-subsisting principle, the soul not only gives 
the body its determination as human, but it also communicates its own act of existing 
to the matter of the body so that one being results, unified by sharing the same act of 
existence. Thus, the functional unity of a person stems from his metaphysical unity, 
but the source of the unity is the participation in a common act of existing rather than 
in the combination of the body and the soul.51 
In this context, a passing comment on the Supreme Court's mention of St. 
Thomas is not out of order. While discussing the history of animation as the crucial 
48. AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, Trans, by James F. Anderson (South Bend, Ind. : University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1975), Book 2, Chapter 49, p. 47. The actual text reads: "if the intellect were a 
body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the 
intellect understands things by these forms which it has in its possession. So, if it were a body, it would 
not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars. But this is patently false. Therefore, no intellect 
is a body." 
49. Ambrose MCNICHOLL, O.P., "Person, Sex, Marriage and Actual Trends of Thought," in Human 
Sexuality and Personhood, Proceedings of the Workshop for the Hierachies of the United States and 
Canada Sponsored by the Pope John Center Through a Grant from the Knights of Columbus 
(St. Louis: Pope John Center, 1981), p. 148. 
50. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I, q.75, a.2. 
51. Ibid, q.76, a.l, ad 5. 
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stage for the advent of personhood in its Roe v. Wade decision, the Court referred to 
"Aquinas' definition of motion as one of the first two principles of life."52 This is a 
misleading and confusing interpretation of Aquinas. As the substantial form of the 
body, the soul is the first act of the body. As such, its primary role is not to make the 
body move. It first specifies the fetal matter as a human being or a person. In light of 
this fundamental act, the human person can exercise all the secondary acts or 
functions such as self-development, operations, and movements, while retaining the 
underlying metaphysical unity. 
Although Aquinas opted for a metaphysical notion of person, it does not follow 
that his idea of personhood is abstract or that he thought that the metaphysical 
dimension exhausts the full measure of person. That would be to overlook the 
importance he attached to existence and to ignore the teleological thrust present in a 
finite being to strive for fulfillment of the possibilities latent in its essence.53 A 
person's existence is constantly being exercised, endowing him with dynamic 
tendencies which urge him on toward self-realization and to interrelationships with 
other people. Every human being undergoes extraordinary physical, psychological, 
and relational changes as that person progresses from first existence to full adulthood 
and on to death. Moreover, the qualities of self-consciousness, intelligence, and 
freedom associated with mature, conscious adults are not apparent at every stage of 
this process or at every moment of time. While the changes and developments of life 
are dramatic and important, the underlying metaphysical structure which perdures is 
even more significant because it insures that the same individual exists before and 
after the modifications take place. Hence, attention must be given not only to a 
person's activities but also to his potentialities, not only to his actual behavior, but 
also to his capacity for behavior.54 Since potentiality has a number of meanings, it 
will be helpful for this study to clarify some of them, for analogous uses of the term 
lie at the heart of some of the confusion and controversy about the nature and the 
origin of the human person. 
The Notion of Potentiality 
In a helpful article on this topic, Francis Wade of Marquette expounds on two 
basic types of potentiality.55 First of all there is the potentiality of a being to undergo 
change or modification. Clay has the capability of being shaped or formed into any 
number of figures by sculptor. Wade calls this quality passive potentiality. However, 
potentiality can also be spoken of actively. Here, the attention is focused on what the 
agent can do rather than on what can be done to it. Wade describes active 
potentiality as a being's innate tendency not only toward activity but toward activity 
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., 113, 133. 
53. MCNICHOLL, pp. 148-151. 
54. Benedict M. ASHLEY, O.P. and Kevin D. O'ROURKE, O.P., Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis 
(St. Louis: The Catholic Association, 1978) p. 225. 
55. Francis C. WADE, "Potentiality in the Abortion Discussion," Review of Metaphysics 22 (1975): 
239-255. 
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of a specific nature. Take the case of a genotype.56 The genotype not only has the 
inherent inclination for self-development, but it also governs the direction the process 
will take. Since active potentialities are the result of a being's inclinations, there will 
be as many different kinds of active potentialities as there are different sorts of 
tendencies.57 
Based on the relationship of a potentiality to its act, Wade distinguishes between 
tendencies which are natural and those which are specifiable. With a natural 
potentiality, the inclination is so deeply ingrained into the nature of a being that its 
activity will not only take place but will do so in a predetermined manner. For 
example, given a favorable environment, an acorn will develop and will only develop 
into an oak tree.58 However, specifiable potentialities are different in that they offer 
only a promise which may or may not be fulfilled. Something beyond the mere 
capability of the agent is needed before this kind of potentiality can be actualized. 
For example, a student may have a specifiable potentiality for playing a musical 
instrument. However, before that talent can be actualized, the student must 
voluntarily consent to learn musical theory and to perfect performance techniques. If 
these learning tasks are ignored, the capacity for playing the musical instrument will 
never be fulfilled. Used in this sense, a potential musician means that someone is not 
now a musician even though the capability is present. ,9 
Natural potentialities operate differently. Here, the future is not only promised 
but guaranteed as far as the agent is concerned. Agents may not always be able to 
control their environment, and, when they cannot, their actions may be partially or 
completely stifled by surrounding circumstances. For example, an apple seed has an 
innate capacity to develop into an apply tree, but it will never do so if it is resting on a 
cement surface. Yet, as far as the inclination toward its specific kind of activity is 
concerned, the seed is prepared to act whenever the external conditions permit.60 
Natural potentialities are best exemplified in living organisms. At any stage in its 
growth, an organism consists both of an actual structure and a number of functions. 
These functions are active natural potentialities, but their actual exercise requires the 
presence of some kind of physical structure. A dog may have an innate tendendy to 
run, but it can only actualize that tendency when it has developed legs. Even more 
fundamental for the organism's growth is its ability to develop whatever structures it 
needs from its own resources. As it develops more elaborate structures, it acquires 
more diversified functions. Thus, in the process of living, a plant develops its roots, 
branches, and leaves. This natural potentiality for self-actualization is the function 
that unifies all other functions and enables the organism to retain its unique identity 
while undergoing some rather dramatic developmental and operational changes.61 
56. The term, genotype, refers to the unique genetic package possessed by the zygote upon the completion 
of fertilization. 
57. WADE, pp. 239-243. 
58. Ibid., p. 243. 
59. Ibid. For parallel discussion of this point, cf. Robert BARRY, O.P., "Self-Consciousness and 
Personhood," The Linacre Quarterly 46 (May 1979): 141-142. 
60. Ibid, p. 244. 
61. ASHLEY and O'ROURKE, pp. 225-226. 
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APPLICATION OF PERSONHOOD TO THE FETUS 
The task of trying to determine the precise time when the notion of personhood 
is applicable to the unborn is a difficult one. The question of when personhood 
begins is not significant in the normal course of fetal gestation. But when the question 
is raised in the context of the abortion issue, the answer becomes both significant and 
controversial. Must the unborn fulfill the criteria of personhood actually or only 
potentially? Few would demand that the status of person be withheld from a 
developing human being unless it gives indications of actually possessing self-
awareness and intelligence, and of actually exercising freedom. Lisa Newton had 
noted that if the actual exercise of these human traits is necessary to be recognized as 
a person, immediate appeals would have to be raised on behalf of the insane, the 
senile, the comatose, and the sleeping, all of whom fail to exercise these traits just as 
the unborn do. Consequently, the fact that only the conscious, adult person exhibits 
the full range of human qualities is not a sufficient warrant to exclude all others.62 So 
the concept of potentiality must be utilized when the question of fetal personhood is 
addressed. But how is potentiality to be employed in this matter ? Loosely speaking, 
two lines of thought emerge here. 
One avenue of thought argues that the unborn are not persons because they lack 
the essential traits of personhood. Intelligence, self-consciousness, freedom, and love 
are not yet developed. However, the unborn are potential persons because they are 
human beings with an innate orientation toward personhood. Actual personhood 
will be acquired when they cross certain predetermined thresholds of growth such as 
brain development, morphological maturity, viability, or birth.63 This group of 
thinkers use potentiality in its active specifiable meaning. 
The second line of thought also applies the concept of potentiality to the unborn 
but does so in a strict, active, natural sense. It views the fetus not as a potential 
person but as a person with enormous potential. It acknowledges that fetal growth is 
gradual, but it contends that the development is of a person not a human being into a 
person. It pictures the various morphological and functional changes that take place 
in nascent life as the gradual unfolding of the radical tendency to become a thinking 
being which was implanted in the physical structure at fertilization.64 
In the context of discussing potentiality, a comment is in order about the 
Supreme Court's rather arbitrary application of the notion to the unborn in its Roe v. 
Wade ruling. The Court permitted some state regulation of abortion in the third 
trimester (after viability) because the fetus is then a "potential life" which 
"presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."65 
Here, the Court's reasoning was puzzling. If the fetus is not a "potential life" before 
viability, what was the basis for the Court's division of pregnancy into trimesters and 
for its assigning different standards of regulation to different stages of gestation ? If 
62. NEWTON, p. 334. 
63. A.G.M. VAN MELSEN, "Person," in Encyclopedia ofBioethics, 4 vols. (New York : Macmillan and Free 
Press, 1978), 2: 1208. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163. 
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the fetus is a "potential life" in the third trimester, must it not also be a "potential 
life" from conception, even if in a less developed form? Furthermore, how is 
potentiality measured? The Court did not pose these questions nor did it offer 
any explanation as to why the capability of existing outside the womb confers a new 
status on the fetus or as to how "meaningful" life is defined.66 It merely asserts that 
the unborn become "potential" persons at viability. 
The Court's earlier refusal to speculate about the nature of fetal life in the 
absence of a consensus as to when personhood begins was puzzling in light of its 
subsequent approach to prenatal existence. As Albert Broderick, then Professor of 
Law at Catholic University, pointed out, the Court had no hesitation "in posing, and 
answering conclusively, the 'iffier' question — when 'meaningful' life begins." 67 It is 
certainly safe to assume that there is as much disagreement among specialits over 
what "potential" and "meaningful" life mean as there is over the definition of 
"person". Yet, the Court did not allow the lack of consensus on "potential" and 
"meaningful" life to deter it from making a detailed division of pregnancy from 
designating viability as the decisive stage. 
As indicated above, I opt for Aquinas' concept of person which envisions the 
soul as the form of the body. It is precisely this metaphysical status which 
characterizes the human being as a person. In this theory, the question of the 
beginning of personhood is reduced to the question of when the spiritual soul is 
present. Because it is the first act of a physical, organized body, the soul cannot 
inform the body until the matter has been suitably unified to receive it. While the 
exact relationship of the human biological structure to personhood remains a 
mystery, biological life is nevertheless quite relevant for establishing the presence of 
personhood. Persons do not exist apart from their bodies. For example, human 
death, the absence of biological life, means the demise of personhood.68 Hence, the 
Thomistic understanding of person relies heavily on biological data to substantiate 
its position. Since the philosopher must theorize from this biological information 
about fetal organization and structure to the conclusion that the spiritual soul is 
present, the beginning of hominization becomes a matter of determining when there 
is a physical structure sufficiently developed to support a spiritual soul.69 
In light of the available scientific evidence about early fetal growth, this study 
proposes that the beginning of personhood coincides with the coming of the primary 
organizer. The philosophical demands for personhood are not fulfilled in the earlier 
stages of human life. It is not a question of the matter being inadequately organized. 
What is known about the genotype and about the life of the early cell mass indicates a 
66. Daniel CALLAHAN, Director of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, and Emily 
MOORE of the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction, offer perceptive 
comments on the Court's handling of this point. Cf. "Abortion : The New Ruling," Hastings Center 
Report 4 (1973): 4-7. 
67. Albert BRODERICK, "A Constitutional Lawyer Looks at the Roe-Doe Decisions," The Jurist 33 ( 1973) : 
124. 
68. Charles CURRAN, "Contemporary Debate in Philosophical and Religious Ethics," in Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics, 4 Vols. (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1978): 1: 18-19. 
69. DIAMOND, p. 317. 
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very complex organization. Rather, the difficulty stems from the lack of internal 
unity and stability in the emerging entity. Prior to the presence of the organizer, it is 
not yet definitively settled whether one, two, or more individuals have resulted from 
the fertilization. Thus, the fetus does not yet meet the philosophical requirements of 
internal stability, uniqueness, and incommunicability necessary for personhood. 
However, as Gabriel Pastrana, O.P. has noted, this early phase of existence is highly 
significant for a Thomistic philosopher.70 From fertilization to the coming of the 
organizer, the fetal matter undergoes a gradual process of organization and 
unification in preparation for the spiritual soul which will stamp it both specifically 
and numerically as a person. 
The behavioral changes resulting from the appearance of the primary organizer 
are dramatic enough that a Scholastic philosopher can reasonably interpret them as a 
sign of the soul's presence. Not only is individuality irreversibly established, but fetal 
development will continue and will follow a definite pattern. When does personhood 
begin ? As with philosophical individuality, both the biological information and its 
philosophical interpretation suggest the second or third week after fertilization.71 
From then on, the fetus should no longer be considered a potential person but a 
person with enormous potential. The unborn person will develop new structures, 
acquire new functions, eventually achieve self-consciousness, experience freedom, 
and enter into personal relationships with others. All of these traits were already 
extant as active natural potentialities with the first act of the soul on the body. Their 
appearance mark important phases in the unfolding of personhood, but none of these 
characteristics signal a qualitative leap into personhood. 
Every judgment about the point in time when the fetus becomes a person 
necessarily involves some theory of personhood. I have elaborated my own views on 
the nature of personhood and its beginnings within the framework of Aquinas' 
metaphysical realism because I think his theory of person is at least as well grounded 
and as coherent as any other. He envisioned person as a unity of body and soul, a 
stable but dynamic being always open to the acquisition of further physical, 
psychological, relational, and spiritual dimensions of personhood. His system also 
provides a philosophical structure which not only takes full account of the biological 
information but also is consistent with it. It was on the basis of the biological data 
that personhood was denied to the zygote at fertilization. The choice of the second or 
70. PASTRANA, pp. 282-284. 
71. This conclusion is not at odds with the stance of the Catholic Church. In the Declaration on Abortion, 
published by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine Of The Faith, the Church reaffirms its 
traditional position that human life is sacred and must be respected from the moment of fertilization. 
However, in footnote 19, this same Declaration acknowledges the disagreement over the time of 
ensoulment. Footnote 19 reads as follows : "This declaration expressly leaves aside the question of the 
moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not unanimous tradition on this point and authors 
are as yet in disagreement. For some it dates from the first instant, for others it could not at least 
precede nidation. It is not within the competence of science to decide between these views, because the 
existence of an immortal soul is not a question in its field. It is a philosophical problem from (1) 
supposing a belated animation, there is still nothing less than a human life, preparing for and calling 
for a soul in which the nature received from parents is completed ; (2) on the other hand it suffices that 
this presence of the soul be probable (and one can never prove the contrary) in order that the taking of 
life involve accepting the risk of killing a man, not only waiting for, but already in possession of his 
soul." 
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third week after conception as the most likely time for ensoulment was also dictated 
by the biological evidence. Still, it must be acknowledged that the conclusion reached 
in this study differs from Aquinas. Whereas, I argue that the fetus should be 
considered a person from approximately two to three weeks after fertilization, he did 
not believe the fetus possessed a rational soul until after the second or third month of 
gestation. My conclusion is based on biological information not available to him in 
the thirteenth century. However, the position of this article is consistent with his 
philosophical principles and the importance he attached to the natural order. 
I am aware that the conclusions I have reached in this study will be initially 
unacceptable in many circles. However, those judgments represent a carefully 
reasoned position grounded in a philosophy of person and consistent with the current 
biological data. They have been formulated with full awareness and understanding of 
the arguments that lead to conclusions that are different from mine. I have not found 
persuasive the line of reasoning that ignores the question of fetal personhood or 
restricts the sanctity of life to some stage of fetal development such as viability or the 
onset of brain activity. In fact, many of the arguments offered in support of abortion 
could also logically justify infanticide and some instances of euthanasia. Since the 
abortion controversy is bound to be with us for the foreseeable future, it is imperative 
that scholarly discussion supporting fetal personhood continues. What is at stake is 
nothing less than who will be included in the category of persons. 
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